Cognitive Radio (CR) with Dynamic Spectrum Access (DSA) is a promising technology to alleviate spectrum shortage problem in wireless communications. Military and commercial interests in the technology are high, to promote greater spectrum efficiency. The CR/DSA radio networking, however, introduces entirely new classes of security threats and providing strong security may prove to be the most difficult aspect of making CR/DSA a viable technology. In this paper, we focus on security vulnerabilities in the physical (PHY) layer of CR/DSA radio networks with energy based spectrum sensing. Various types of threats in PHY layer will be described, a testbed was developed and the results of security assessments on Primary User Emulation attack, Denial of Service attack and Spectrum Honeypot attack will be presented.
INTRODUCTION
Radio electromagnetic spectrum is a precious and limited resource for uses in wireless communications. The current statically allocated model results in an insufficient amount of spectrum to meet the growing demands of both commercial and military users. Studies show that allocated spectrum is often heavily underutilized [1], [2] , [3] .
Opportunistically reclaiming the unused allocated/licensed spectrum for other applications, without interference to the licensed user (a.k.a Primary User (PU)), has great potential to alleviate spectrum shortage problems. CR/DSA technology was introduced to serve the purpose [4] .
As of today, CR is a multi-dimensional awareness, learning and adaptation technology that encompasses, but is not limited to electromagnetic environment (DSA), climate environment, terrain, geolocation, power, modulation, coding and routing. To date, however, most efforts have focused on development and implementation of a DSA engine for CR, such as the DARPA XG and WNaN programs. A DSA engine allows spectrum Secondary Users (SU) to exploit local and instantaneous spectrum availability on a non-interfering basis and without PU negotiation, thus it provides a means to achieve spectral efficiency and robustness for spectrum dependent systems. A DSA engine can also learn from the electromagnetic environment to establish its environment adaptation policy. Ironically, being capable of adapting also means being capable of being taught by a "bad" instructor with bad information resulting in unintended behavior; e.g. vulnerable to security threats [5] . In this paper, we focus on security vulnerabilities in the PHY layer of CR/DSA networks, specifically on networks that employ energy based spectrum sensing techniques. The remainder of this paper will be organized as follows.
Section 2 discusses different types of security threats in PHY layer. Section 3 presents security assessments on specific DSA radios with testing results. Section 4 summarizes the paper.
SECURITY THREATS IN PHYSICAL LAYER
The PHY layer in a CR with DSA engine is more complex than a general one because it can dynamically sense and transmit/receive on various frequencies across a frequency spectrum range. In general, security threats to wireless communication networks are classified into two types:
outsider threat and insider threat. Outsider threat attempts to inject energy into the targeted network to achieve a desired goal. Insider threat attempts to use its network member status to act as a malicious node to achieve a desired goal.
These two types of threat are applicable to both CR and non-CR networks, however, the principal of operation without interference to a PU makes CR/DSA especially vulnerable to injections that produce bad spectrum sensing information.
Insider Threat
Insider threat, i.e. byzantine threat, is normally a legitimate member of the network and is compromised with malicious intent. In attacking a DSA engine of a CRN, a byzantine node can act as a jammer to control the operating frequency of the CR/DSA network. The frequency spectrum jamming can be achieved with either Physical Jamming or Virtual Jamming.
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As a legitimate member of the CRIDSA network, a byzantine node has knowledge of the spectrum sensing algorithm of the network and uses this information to transmit RF signals with the intent to trick the network into believing frequency channels are occupied by PU signals. In a "listen-before-talk" CRIDSA network, all the malicious node needs to do is to transmit during the network's sensing period as shown in Fig. I . The DSA engine employs energy sensing scheme but cannot make an accurate distinction between the PU and the malicious transmission [6] .
Consequently, the effected CRiDSA radios are tricked into believing that the channel is occupied by PU. Also, by way of spectrum sensing information sharing, the faulty sensing information is spread and indirectly affects other members of the network beyond the RF range of the malicious node. Physical RF jamming also could be carried out by the byzantine node in an indirect method in which the infected node transmits spectrum utilization information to an out-of network jammer, for an external attack. The advantage of this approach is that an out-of-network jammer normally has much more radiated RF power than a byzantine node, hence its effects are broader.
In Virtual Jamming the infected node maliciously alters and spreads spectrum sensing information that indicates channels are not available. This type of attack is more powerful, because it does not require the infected node to have high radiated power. QoS during the testing. Fig. 3 presents a data set of the testing. As expected, shortening the jammer dwell time (e.g. the more often the DSA channel had to move) reduced the data throughput. In a DSA context, DoS means denial to spectrum access and it could be achieved in many ways.
Outsider Threat
DoS with wideband noise -In this method the jammer is a wideband noise source that sends out energy cover the targeted CRIDSA network spectrum sensing bandwidth. In this setup, the power level of the wide band noise was just above the UUTs' detection threshold (-90dBm). The noise waveform was created on the host computer using a MA TLAB script. The waveform was then transferred to an A WG for transmission. Observation showed that as soon as the wideband noise waveform was transmitted, the UUTs blocked out the entire spectrum because it appeared to the DSA that the spectrum was fully occupied. Results indicate that simple physical RF jamming can produce significant damage to CRiDSA network performance. In literature, counter attack techniques have been proposed such as described in [5] , [6] , [7] , [8] and many others. Efficiencies and feasibilities of proposed counter attack algorithms are the subject for other studies. 
